Introduction
In Chapter 9, the South African Constitution establishes six independent "state institutions supporting constitutional democracy". They are the Public Protector (or, in international jargon, ombudsman), the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC), the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (the CRL Commission), the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), the Auditor-General and the Electoral Commission. 1 The first section of Chapter 9 asserts the independence of these six institutions in strong terms. It states:
(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.
(3) Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions.
* Professor of Constitutional Law and Human Rights at the University of Cape Town. I would like to thank Tendai Nhenga and Sara Hilliard for research support while I was writing this article. 1 A seventh institution is referred to in Chapter 9, an independent broadcasting authority. However, unlike the other six, this institution is not established by the Constitution. Instead, s 192 states that it must be established by law. In fact, an independent broadcasting authority was established in 1993, before the interim Constitution came into effect (Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993). The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 replaced or, rather, renamed and redesigned the authority, which is now the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Although the Constitution says that this authority must be independent, the provisions of s 181, which establish the independence of the other six institutions, do not apply to it. Instead, the way in which its independence is protected is left to ordinary law.
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The independence and impartiality of … an Auditor-General and a Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public service.
Although only two of the Chapter 9 institutions, the Auditor-General and the Public Protector, were made essential ingredients of the final Constitution, three other independent institutions with related mandates were included in the Interim Constitution: the HRC, the Independent Electoral Commission and the CGE. 7 In 1996, the Constitutional Assembly added yet another to the group, the Commission on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Cultural,
Religious and Linguistic Communities. Now grouped together in Chapter 9 of the Constitution, they are colloquially referred to as the "Chapter 9s".
As in the past, over the last year or so press coverage of the "Chapter 9s" has often been critical. One sometimes has the impression of institutions lurching from one crisis to another. Criticism of the Chapter 9 institutions varies of course. There are the essentially political allegations that their work is insufficiently independent. Most recently the Public Protector was at the receiving end of such criticism in the context of the investigation into the "Oilgate" affair. 8 There are also concerns that members of the Commissions are partisan. This issue was raised in an unexpectedly direct way when it emerged that a number of members of the CGE were on ANC party lists for the 2004 elections. Sometimes critics object to the manner in which the Chapter 9s prioritise their work or the way in which they go about it. More mundanely, there are allegations of ineffective management -the HRC was publicly exposed to Sometimes information that the public receives about the Chapter 9s will be misleading. Sometimes, of course, it is right. Each of the issues that I have mentioned, and others that have come under the public eye, is important and demands attention. Allegations that institutions set up to be independent are partial are very serious. But I mention these issues for another reason. Many of them reflect a lack of understanding of the roles of the Chapter 9s on the part of the institutions themselves, government, Parliament and, sometimes, their critics and the public.
In this paper I discuss the mandate of these institutions and in so doing I hope to contribute to the process of developing a shared understanding of their constitutional role and to provoke some discussion of the implications of South Africa's current political context on that role. Here, the electoral dominance of the governing African National Congress is particularly significant.
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The six institutions established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution have distinct roles and responsibilities. Nevertheless their grouping under Chapter 9 is not accidental and I think that they all share two roles: that of checking government (or, in the language of the Constitution, of contributing to accountable and government or "monitoring" government), and that of contributing to the transformation of South Africa into a society in which social justice prevails.
Before explaining these shared roles, I will discuss what they have in common -why they are all considered "state institutions supporting constitutional democracy". 11 Then, moving onto their mandate, I will describe the two roles 5/26 that I think they share. Thirdly, I will comment briefly on the distinct roles of each of the Chapter 9s. And, finally, and even more briefly, I will look at the roles of their individual members.
What sets the Chapter 9 institutions apart?
Although Chapter 9 brings together six distinct institutions, they have important things in common which suit them for their twofold roles as institutions intended both to check government and to contribute to transformation. Three features are relevant here:
• Although they are state institutions, they are outside government; they are not "a branch of government".
• Like the courts, they are expected to be independent and impartial.
• To differing degrees they are "intermediary institutions", providing a link between people on the one hand and the executive and Parliament on the other.
To start with what the Chapter 9s are not: Under the traditional framework of separation of powers, government is divided into three "branches" within which all government institutions fall. 12 However, the Chapter 9 institutions are not legislative, judicial or executive organs -they are not "a branch of government". Prompted by the large number of complaints that the Commission has received about the government's failure to fulfil its obligation to provide a right to basic education, the hearings provided an opportunity for citizens and the government to raise concerns about education. 18 Because hearings like this are generally not adversarial and because the reports drafted by the Commission after previous hearings have credibility, the hearings provide an effective way of assessing problems and drawing government's attention to them.
But it is not only the three human rights institutions, the HRC, the CGE and the CRL Commission, that might be expected to fulfil this intermediary role. Barrie describes the role of the Public Protector thus:
Not only are grievances remedied, but the likelihood of their recurrence is lessened. This, ombudsmen accomplish by acting as conduits of communication between citizens and the government. above, I think that they share a common mandate: they are intended both to check government -by enhancing its accountability -and to contribute to the constitutional project of transformation. Certainly, the appropriate emphasis on transformation and checking government varies from institution to institution, but, nevertheless, to some extent both responsibilities touch each Chapter 9. In bearing these two responsibilities their role is entirely congruent with the overall constitutional commitment to limited government and transformation that is captured succinctly in the Preamble to the Commission:
We ….adopt this Constitution …so as to …[l]ay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law -and [i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person.
Checking
The idea that government should be checked is familiar. In liberal democratic constitutions like ours, checks and balances on government take many forms. The court makes this comment in the context of a discussion of the protection of cultural rights, but it applies more generally too.
C MURRAY PER 2006(2)
10/26 control the legal system by choosing our top judges or control the implementation of policy by managing the budget. They cannot order the executive to act in a certain way and they cannot penalise unconstitutional behaviour. Indeed, in conferring a checking role on the HRC, the CGE and the CRL Commission, the Constitution uses less direct language too -it gives them the power to "monitor" government (and other institutions). In short, the check that the Chapter 9s provide on the exercise of government power is not through the exercise of power. Instead, they check government power by providing a legitimate and authoritative account of government's record, which can be used by citizens and Parliament in scrutinising government's performance.
This manner of securing accountable government has been described in various ways. An increasingly familiar distinction in discussions of accountability is that between enforceability and answerability. Reif puts it this way:
Answerability is … the power given to an institution to ask "accountable actors" to give information on their decisions and to explain the facts and the reasons upon which these decisions are based, whereas the enforcement element of accountability is composed of punishment or other negative sanctions for inappropriate behaviour. 
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If the focus is on compliance, it is possible to look not only at the effectiveness of mechanisms to obtain enforcement of the law (the "sticks" approach), but also at approaches or incentives that engender voluntary conformity with the law (the "carrots" approach).
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She would then characterise the control that our Chapter 9s can apply to government as "'cooperative control' as opposed to the 'coercive control' of the courts". 24 She describes this distinction further:
Cooperative control is facilitative and proactive, using advice and persuasion, wherein the actors confer and dialogue to try to obtain the desired result and change behaviour. In contrast, coercive control is reactive, and control is imposed by unilateral decision. The Auditor-General's authority lies in his power to get information and the credibility of his reports. The credibility of the reports in turn lies both in the quality and professionalism of the work of the Auditor-General's office and in the legitimacy of the office as an independent constitutional institution.
Ultimately, the force of the Auditor-General as an institution that contributes to accountable government lies in influence, not in formal power. 
12/26
As an intermediary institution that brings people outside the state sector into accountability processes, the Auditor-General is weak. He (or she) provides information which the public can use to hold the government to account, but he does not actively engage the public. However, as an institution that enforces accountability by making government answerable, the Auditor-General is the most powerful of the Chapter 9s. This is partly due to the professional (and objective) nature of the work of the Auditor-General and perhaps partly to the fact that the institution is well-established both here and in other democracies.
The role of the Chapter 9s as institutions making government answerable and exerting "cooperative" control is also evident when one looks at the work of the CGE or the HRC. They are intended to investigate the implementation of rights and engage with government and, particularly, Parliament. Like the AuditorGeneral, they can demand that the government provides an account of its actions. The Human Rights Commission's reports on social and economic rights are a good example of the way in which the Chapter 9s can contribute to accountable government through influence rather than enforcement. In compiling these reports it has an opportunity to verify information from government by drawing on information from the public. In this way it both draws the public into accountability processes and provides Parliament and the public with a credible assessment of government performance.
Of course, the effectiveness of these "soft" accountability mechanisms is not guaranteed by constitutional declarations of their independence and impartiality, special appointment processes or security of tenure. This is especially the case in a situation of one-party dominance where super majorities for appointment and dismissal are rendered ineffective in securing inter-party support because the governing party can choose the incumbents of the Chapter 9 institutions. 25 In such circumstances, the challenge the
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13/26 individuals in office under Chapter 9 face to establish their credibility and to fulfil their responsibilities effectively, is formidable.
Transformation
The second shared constitutional mandate of the Chapter 9s is to contribute to the project of transformation that the Constitution embraces. The Commission for Gender Equality has a similarly forward-looking role. It must…promote respect for gender equality and the protection, development and attainment of gender equality. Nevertheless, each contributes to the transformation project. Even the most contained of the institutions, the Auditor-General, has embraced an approach to its role that is more proactive and forward looking than a purely checking function might be. First, supplementing traditional audit reports with reporting on under spending the Auditor-General has alerted government (and the public) to central problems with the current transformation agenda. Secondly, the Auditor-General is exploring ways of doing "performance auditing" which goes beyond traditional auditing and provides an assessment of the effectiveness of financial management policies.
It is possible for these two responsibilities -checking government and promoting transformation -to be seen as contradictory or in tension with one another. Checking government may be seen to set the Chapter 9s in opposition to the government, while some believe that any contribution to the transformation process must necessarily be synchronised with government policy. But there is no necessary tension nor did our constitution-makers 30 S 187(1). 31 S 5(1)(d) and (k) Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
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15/26 visualise a tension or contradiction. In an excellent analysis of the work of the CGE, Gay Seidman puts it this way:
As in many other new democracies, South Africa's democratically elected constituent assembly recognized that a negotiated transition meant change would be slow and gradual. … Even after the 1994 elections, new ministers had to rely heavily on the civil servants already in place for information and for policy implementation. In this context, independent horizontal bodies appeared as important innovations designed to offer channels through which citizens could appeal outside the normal structures of government, as they sought to define their newly granted constitutional rights in practice. … [Independent institutions] were … designed to give the new government greater flexibility, to challenge past practice, and to create a more democratic polity and culture. Secondly, the individual mandates of the Chapter 9s are very broad. This, again, is particularly the case in relation to the three human rights institutions.
For instance, they are not only responsible for promoting and protecting human rights vis a vis the state, but their mandate also extends to the private sector.
Moreover, the Constitution and their enabling statutes provide a long list of functions that they can perform in fulfilling their mandates. 34 These lists are a clear indication of the discretion that the Commissions have in determining what they will do -the intention seems to be to ensure that they have real flexibility in fulfilling their mandates.
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The third point concerns the implementation of the mandates of the three human rights institutions. The fact that they have distinct roles and that their enabling legislation gives them considerable flexibility in fulfilling these roles should not be taken to mean that their mandates are easy to implement or easily interpreted. First, there are obvious issues of prioritising and much of the criticism of the Chapter 9s in the past has related to the way in which they have prioritised tasks. However, as Seidman shows in relation to the CGE, the interpretation of mandates raises more substantial issues than what should be done first. She suggests that the virtual stalemate in the CGE in 2000 was 33 There is debate about the continued existence of these three separate institutions. In particular, questions are asked about the role of the CGE. The debate is not new. When it was included in the interim Constitution there were three views: (i) that gender rights (or, really, women's rights) were in danger of marginalisation and that a special focus was imperative; (ii) that a special institution for gender rights was an important transitional tool for ensuring that gender was 'mainstreamed' in South Africa and, more particularly, on the new government's agenda; and (iii) that a separate institution for gender rights would simply itself marginalise women's interests as other institutions would comfortably relinquish responsibility and leave the institution with an impossible burden. There are strong arguments for consensus reports from the Commissions.
They settle matters and are inevitably more influential than divided positions would be. However, reports which reflect no dissent will not always be credible.
As I suggest in the previous section, it is unlikely that Commissioners will always agree on the issues with which they deal. 20/26
Conclusion
The institutions established in Chapter 9 have important mandates. Their role is particularly significant now because constitutional democracy in South Africa faces a number of specific interrelated challenges:
• First, it is a young and impressionable democracy and our understanding of constitutional democracy and the rule of law is still developing.
Located outside government, but with constitutional legitimacy, the Chapter 9s have an opportunity to explain what constitutional democracy means 41 and provide examples of the value of real debate and the tolerance of a diversity of opinions.
• Second, the South African government is faced with the formidable challenges of huge needs and expectations with limited human capacity.
To meet the challenge, the state has broad discretionary powers. At the same time, administrative systems are immature and under great pressure. As public watchdogs, the Chapter 9s can hold government to account, reassuring the public when all is well and alerting it to problems when it is not.
• Thirdly, we are a one-party dominant state. It is important to note that dominance is not illegitimate. Instead, it is a reflection of the ANC's success in government. Nevertheless, it brings with it the danger that the party comes to feel that it owns the system and pays limited attention to opposition or even the voters. As intermediary institutions the Chapter 9s
offer citizens an opportunity to express their needs and concerns. The
Chapter 9s can also demonstrate the compatibility of constructive debate concurring opinions that reflect slightly different approaches. However, its record suggests that on certain issues of outstanding national importance such as the certification of the Constitution, great effort was made to reach consensus. In short, we need the Chapter 9s -but we need them to be independent, rigorous in overseeing government and relentless in pursuing transformation.
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